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ABSTRACT. Although risk and uncertainty are inevi-
table aspects of the sustainability problem, they are often
neglected in the sustainability discourse, especially in the
economic analysis of sustainable development. We argue
that this deprives the sustainability discourse of interesting
connections to risk management. We show that defining
sustainability as the obligation to limit the risk of harming
future individuals provides a framework in which tools
from risk management, like mean-variance analysis, can
be employed to analyze planning decisions and to
calculate a risk-minimizing policy mix. Furthermore,
we discuss whether such a notion of sustainability can be
an ethically tenable sustainability concept and how a
positive probability of harming future individuals might
be defended.
KEY WORDS: altruism, fairness, mean-variance analy-
sis, risk, sustainability, uncertainty
Introduction
Sustainability has become a major framework for
evaluating decisions with long-lasting consequences
both on a political and on a firm-level scale. How-
ever, although much progress has been made in
defining, measuring, and applying sustainability,
some fundamental problems have received surpris-
ingly little attention. One of these problems is the
relation between risk and sustainability.
In a perspective slightly broader than the
Brundtland definition, sustainability is a framework
for assessing the impact of present decisions on the
situation of future individuals. Any definition of
sustainability that is covered by this perspective has
to consider the future consequences of present
actions. Any non-dictatorial notion of sustainability
has also to be sensitive to future individuals’
conceptions of well-being. Thus, at the core of
sustainability lies futurity.
However, a necessary implication of futurity is
uncertainty. Neither can we possibly know what
conceptions of well-being future individuals will
have as they are not in existence yet. Nor can we
predict the future consequences of present decisions
with certainty. All we can do is to assess the risks that
present decisions impose on future individuals. So
sustainability needs to be stated in terms of risks
rather than in terms of certitudes.
Surprisingly, formal models of sustainability,
especially in economics, have largely ignored this
point. Either the uncertainty of the consequences of
present decisions is neglected or it is taken as a reason
for using vague definitions of sustainability. While
these approaches have some merits in the political
arena, they are highly problematic whenever sus-
tainability is used in the context of a decision pro-
cess. Neglecting uncertainty is problematic, because
it allocates all risk-related costs to future generations,
which contradicts the main tenet of sustainable
development. Vague definitions of sustainability may
be helpful to gain political acceptance (cf. Robinson,
2004). However, usually they do not result in
operational concepts that can be used for choosing
between different actions.
So at least in a decision context, ignoring risks is
not a viable option. Indeed, outside the sustainability
discourse, decisions with long-lasting consequences
are frequently analyzed in a stochastic framework.
Decision theory provides an extensive set of tools for
such an analysis. However, these tools stem from a
purely positive context. They can be used to analyze
how a given individual’s interest is best furthered in a
risky world. However, they shed only a dim light on
the question of how risks should be allocated among
different individuals.
In this article, we use a recent concept of sus-
tainability from economic literature and show that it
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provides a link between an ethically tenable notion
of sustainability and often-used tools of risk man-
agement. This concept is based on limiting the
probability that a future generation is harmed, where
a fairness-based criterion is employed to decide what
constitutes ‘‘harm.’’ We show that it establishes an
interesting connection with some tools of risk
management. This connection permits adoption of
these tools for assessing the sustainability of actions
whose consequences are uncertain and facilitates
finding a policy mix that minimizes the risk of
harming future individuals.
Our analysis is based on a decision theory
framework that can be used on any scale. It applies
to a firm interested in analyzing the sustainability
of different actions, to a regional administration
inquiring about the sustainability of development
plans, as well as at a national and international level,
where sustainability relates to nearly all political
decisions.
In the next section, we set up our framework and
highlight the connections between sustainability and
risk management. In section The ethical dimension
of a risk-based concept of sustainability, we discuss
possible ways to construct an ethical foundation for a
risk-based notion of sustainability. Section Discus-
sion and conclusions concludes.
Sustainability as risk containment
If we neglect studies that make only passing refer-
ences to risk and uncertainty without adapting their
analysis to the specific problems caused by uncertain
outcomes and uncertain preferences, formal con-
cepts of sustainability that account for uncertainty
are rare in the literature. Some studies like Wood-
ward (2000) and Asheim and Brekke (2002) consider
outcome uncertainty; that is, unpredictable influ-
ences on the future consequences of present deci-
sions. Other studies, like Heal et al. (1998), Ayong
Le Kama (2001), Ayong Le Kama and Schubert
(2004), and Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), inquire
about the effects of preference uncertainty; that is,
the imperfect predictability of future individuals’
evaluations of their situation.
In this article, we use the criterion of sustainability
advanced in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006),1 which, in
turn, is based on combining the fairness-based
definition of sustainability given in Woodward
(2000) with the theory of social targeting developed
in Naga (2003), Cornia and Stewart (1995), and
Sen (1995).
This criterion holds that an action is sustainable if
the probability that a future generation is harmed by
this action is limited by a constant a. A future gen-
eration is seen as being harmed, whenever it would
have preferred the state of the world without the
action to that with the action.2 This criterion con-
tains some often discussed concepts of sustainability
as special cases; that is, as special choices of a. As
shown in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), it includes
weak sustainability for a = 50% and strong sustain-
ability for a = 0%, if some assumptions on prefer-
ences, technological possibilities, and expectations
are met. For any a < 100%, the criterion can also be
seen as a version of non-declining welfare.
This definition of sustainability is based on a
notion of fairness that is defined relative to a status
quo; that is, to the situation unchanged by actions of
the present generation. Future generations have a
‘‘right of veto’’ against actions that they regard as
being detrimental to their situation. However, they
have no legitimate claim to demand changes to the
status quo. The definition is based on fairness in that
it employs an envy-based criterion3 for deciding
which actions are potentially harmful to future
individuals. Given that envy is based on the com-
parison of states from the perspective of a single
individual, the above sustainability criterion is free of
interpersonal welfare comparisons. It can thus be
used even if present and future generations do not
share a common notion of well-being.
The relation between risk and sustainability
The above definition of sustainability provides a
useful framework to discuss the relation between risk
and sustainability. Consider a decision between
several actions that have long-lasting consequences.
This decision may be a firm’s decision between
investment options, a planning decision of a regional
authority, or a political decision at national or
international levels.
For each action, we could calculate the expected
impact on the well-being of every future genera-
tion. However, due to the uncertainty of future
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preferences and the imperfect predictability of the
actions’ outcomes, the actual consequences will
usually deviate from these expected impacts. Planning
with only the expected impacts would allocate the
risk of such deviations completely to future genera-
tions, which is not consistent with the notion of
sustainability. So for assessing the sustainability of an
action, we need to include information about the
possible deviations from the expected impacts. The
above concept of sustainability uses such information
to calculate and limit the probability of harming a
future generation.
Let us consider a fictive example to highlight this
approach. Assume that the use of a given area of land
has to be decided. There are three alternative pro-
posals: The land could be used as a recreational area,
it could be zoned for residential use, or it could be
used for industrial production. Assume that resi-
dential and industrial use have a higher expected
benefit than recreational use, but also share increased
risk; the benefit and risk of industrial use exceeding
that of residential use. In all three cases, the uncer-
tainty is a conglomerate of outcome uncertainty
(e.g., it is not sure which social benefits the industrial
use will have) and preference uncertainty (e.g.,
future preferences for recreation are uncertain).
For presentational simplicity, we distinguish only
between close and distant future generations.
In Table I, we have set fictive values for the
expected benefits (relative to the status quo) and the
standard deviation of the benefits for each alterna-
tive. In practice, establishing such numbers will be
difficult at best. However, although this approach
seems to be complicated, variants of it are commonly
used for informing political decisions. For example,
the IPCC reports on climate change contain differ-
ent scenarios for global warming, each of which is
given some credence, which might be used to
construct expected values and risk measures.
To evaluate this information according to the
above criterion of sustainability, we identify for each
possible action and for each future generation the
probability that the action results in a situation that is
(from the view of the generation in question) worse
than the status quo. For each action we then identify
the future generation that is most likely to be
harmed and use the probability of harming this
generation as the rating of this action.
In this way, we can rank the alternatives: the
actions with a lower probability of harming a future
generation are better according to the above crite-
rion than those with a higher probability of doing
harm. Furthermore, we can identify which alterna-
tives remain, if we wish to constrain the probability
of harming a future generation to some level a.
For the data of Table I, we have depicted this
approach in Figure 1.4 As this figure shows, this
concept yields results that differ substantially from
those based on a deterministic analysis. The alter-
native ‘‘industrial use’’ has the highest expected
value and would thus be chosen in a deterministic
context. However, due to the higher variance of its
outcomes, it has a greater probability of harming the
depicted generation than the other alternatives.
Indeed, it is the worst choice, in the sense, that it
results in the highest risk of being harmful to future
generations. The alternative ‘‘residential use’’ yields
a better balance between expected benefit and risk.
It implies the lowest probability of harming a future
generation and would thus be recommended by our
approach, if a single alternative has to be chosen.
As this simple example shows, it is essential to
consider not only the expected consequences when
assessing the sustainability of projects but also the
TABLE I
The expected benefits (l) relative to the status quo, and the standard deviation of benefits (r) for close and distant gen-
erations for the three land use decisions (fictive example)
Usage Close generation Distant generation
l r l r
Recreational 0.33 0.1 0.33 0.25
Residential 0.66 0.2 0.66 0.4
Industrial 1 0.5 1 1
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projects’ risks. The concept outlined above provides
a framework for analyzing the trade-off between the
expected benefit a project might have for future
generations and the risk that it imposes upon them.
In Figure 2, we have depicted this trade-off for
the case of a normal distribution of future benefits.
The lines in the figure represent all combinations of
expected benefit and standard deviation that imply
the same probabilities of causing harm. The nearer
the line approaches the lower right corner of the
diagram, the smaller is this probability, and, conse-
quently, the notion of sustainability that is associated
with it will pose greater demands (i.e., it corresponds
to a lower a).
With such a diagram, we can evaluate action
proposals according to their sustainability. In the
example depicted in Figure 2, we see that it is always
the ‘‘distant generation’’ that is most likely to suffer.
With respect to this generation, the alternatives
‘‘recreational use’’ and ‘‘residential use’’ are sustain-
able at the level a = 10%. However, the alternative
‘‘residential use’’ is preferable to the alternative
‘‘recreational use,’’ because the former is even sus-
tainable at the level a = 5%, whereas the latter is
not. Thus, we can conclude that the alternative
‘‘residential use’’ is the preferable choice and that it
imposes a probability of harming future generations
that is, at most, 5%.
Employing risk management tools for sustainability
The above analysis has shown that it is possible to
transfer some tools of decision theory to the sus-
tainability discourse on the basis of a rigorous defi-
nition of sustainability. This approach has the
additional advantage that we can not only use the
descriptive techniques outlined above, but can also
employ concepts from risk management to search for
policies that actively reduce the risks that present
actions impose on future generations.
For this, we need information about the interre-
lationship of consequences arising from different
alternatives. In many settings, future constellations of
preferences and uncertain influences on outcomes
that render one alternative disastrous will render
another alternative advantageous, and vice versa.
Thus, the evaluated outcomes of different alterna-
tives will often be correlated. Such correlations are
usually measured by correlation coefficients like
those displayed in Table II for the fictive example.
If such correlations exist, it will usually be
advantageous to implement a policy mix instead of
choosing a single alternative. By using a portfolio of
alternatives, for example, a diversified energy system,
the risk of disastrous outcomes can be decreased.
The question is how a reasonable policy mix can be
calculated.
Modern portfolio theory enables us to address this
question. The above approach is able to adopt
methodological applications from this literature
because it formulates the sustainability problem as a
decision between risk and expected benefit. The
literature provides an extensive set of tools for this
purpose. However, for presentational simplicity, we
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Figure 1. The distribution (under the normal distribu-
tion assumption) of the evaluated outcomes x for the
three land use alternatives. The right plot is a magnified
depiction of the rectangular area indicated in the left
plot. The vertical line in the right plot represents the
status quo. The shaded areas depict the probabilities of
harming the generation for each alternative.
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Figure 2. Lines of constant probabilities of harming a
future generation for a normal distribution depicted in
dependency of the standard deviation of benefits r and
of the expected benefit l (measured relative to the sta-
tus quo). The circles correspond to the outcome of the
three alternatives of Table I for close generations and
the dots to those for distant generations.
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use only the simplest possible construct that is
applicable in our setting. This is mean-variance
analysis, which dates back to Markowitz (1952) and
which, although being largely discarded in economic
theory,5 is still frequently used in applied finance.
Mean-variance is focused on calculating combi-
nations of alternatives that result in the smallest
variance of returns for a given expected return. In
our context, we can use this approach to calculate a
risk-minimizing portfolio of actions.
Let us perform such an analysis for the land use
example by assuming that we can implement not
only each alternative, but also all combinations of the
three alternatives; for example, by using a part of the
land for each alternative. The question is how much
land should be reserved for which usage.
Following the mean-variance concept,6 we can
calculate the efficient frontier. The efficient frontier
describes the minimal risk for a given expected
benefit that is achievable by some mix of the alter-
natives. In Figure 3, we have depicted this minimal
risk as a function of the expected benefit.
This figure indicates that, except for the points on
the boundary (i.e., an expected benefit of 1/3 or 1),
it is always recommendable to use a policy mix: for
all points on the efficient frontier, at least two land
uses have a share of the land that is strictly greater
than zero.
This is a standard result. However, it is interesting
to combine it with the above risk-based perception
of sustainability. In Figure 4, we have simulta-
neously depicted the efficient frontier of Part (a) of
Figure 3 with the levels of sustainability shown in
Figure 2.
There are two ways to use this figure. First, we
can set a maximal probability of harming a future
generation and accept all alternatives that achieve
this goal. In this case, we use the corresponding thin
line in Figure 4 and all points on the efficient
frontier (thick line) that lie on or below this thin line
represent acceptable efficient alternatives.
Second, we can try to minimize the probability of
harming a future generation. This is achieved at the
(usually unique) point at which a thin line is tangential
to the efficient frontier. In our setting, this point is
given by l  0.47, r  0.156, which according to
Figure 3b corresponds to 59.55% of the land being
dedicated to recreational use, 40.24% to residen-
tial use, and 0.21% being reserved for industrial use.
TABLE II
Correlation coefficients between the risks for distant generations for the three land use decisions (fictive example)
Usage Recreational Residential Industrial
Recreational 1 -0.5 0.4
Residential -0.5 1 -0.6
Industrial 0.4 -0.6 1
0.33 0.66 1
µ
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
σ
(a)
0.33 0.66 1
µ
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
η
(b)
recreat.
resident.
indust.
Figure 3. The efficient frontier calculated from a
mean-variance approach with the data of Tables I and
II (Plot a), and the shares g of the three alternatives on
the efficient frontier (Plot b).
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Figure 4. The efficient frontier (thick line) from Fig-
ure 3 (Plot a) is combined with the lines of constant
probabilities of harming a future generation from Fig-
ure 2 (thin lines). The thin lines correspond to proba-
bilities of harming a future generation of 20%, 10%,
5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.132%, and 0.01% (from the upper-left
to the lower-right line).
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With this combination of alternatives, the risk of
harming a future generation is reduced to 0.13%.
Comparing this to the case where only a single
alternative is used demonstrates the potential power
of the application of risk management techniques
to the problem of sustainability: the best single-
alternative choice (residential use) implies a risk of
4.779% of harming a future generation; the optimal
policy mix reduces this to 0.13%. If we had ne-
glected the risk altogether, the likely choice would
have been industrial use. This decision would have
harmed a future generation with a probability of
nearly 16%, that is, more than a hundred times the
minimal achievable risk.
Of course, this is only a fictive example. How-
ever, as mean-variance analysis shows, the main
qualitative result, that diversification can be used to
reduce risks and thus to achieve a more sustainable
outcome, is robust. The analysis could be redone
with almost all reasonable values for the parameters
given in Tables I and II and, although the resulting
numbers will vary, the main message that a policy
mix furthers sustainability will remain.
Indeed, this risk reduction effect is commonly
taken advantage of on financial markets, where most
investors hold a portfolio of assets to reduce the total
risk by means of diversification. Our analysis shows
that concepts that have proven to be valuable in
finance can be applied to the analysis of sustain-
ability. The necessary transfer of methods is not
undertaken on an ad-hoc basis, but on the foundation
of a definition of sustainability that includes several
commonly used sustainability concepts.
This approach has the advantage that it allows not
only for a rigorous application of the tools of risk
management, but also for a detailed assessment of its
ethical implications, as we show in the following
section.
The ethical dimension of a risk-based
concept of sustainability
Until now, we have sidestepped the question of
whether limiting the probability of harming future
generations is an ethically tenable concept of sus-
tainability. Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), from whom
we have adapted this concept, do not address this
point in depth. Furthermore, even if we can give a
tentatively positive answer to this question, we still
have to ask how an ‘‘acceptable’’ risk of harming
future generations can be chosen. We discuss these
points successively.
Is risk containment an ethically tenable approach
to sustainability?
The first important observation is that in a world
where the consequences of today’s actions can only
be imperfectly predicted and where we cannot
possibly know what state of the world future indi-
viduals will prefer, there is only a limited chance of
certainly not harming future generations. Further-
more, as Krysiak and Krysiak (2006) have shown,
such a demanding protection of future individuals
(which corresponds to setting a = 0%) will severely
restrict our ability to better the fate of future people.
Indeed, as they argue, the situation is somewhat
similar to hypothesis testing in statistics: the more
certain we like to be of not accepting a wrong
hypothesis, the higher becomes the probability of
rejecting a true hypothesis. The surer we wish to be
of not harming future generations, the more likely
we will decline actions that would benefit both the
present and future generations.7
The above definition of sustainability permits us
to balance the risks of harming and not benefiting
future individuals. Given that actively harming
someone is commonly seen as worse than passively
not bettering someone’s situation (even if both
decisions result in the same deprivation),8 the former
risk should presumably be lower than the latter,
which in our context requires us to set a suitably low
level for a. However, in most cases, it will be rea-
sonable to allow for some positive risk of harming
future individuals, because, otherwise, the possibili-
ties for raising the welfare of future and present
individuals would be severely reduced, often leav-
ing only the option of preserving the status quo.
Indeed, as we will argue below, given only infor-
mation that is currently available, future individuals
would insist on taking on some risk in order to
achieve a higher expected standard of living. Thus,
there is a level a > 0 that is acceptable for all future
individuals.
So the basic concept of allowing for some prob-
ability of harming future individuals seems to be
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tenable. However, in order to be acceptable, the
concept must also reflect adequate congruence be-
tween risk-induced costs and the responsibility for
the risk-causing action. Since we have two sources
of uncertainty, this translates into two distinct
questions. First, owing to preference uncertainty, we
have the question of responsibility for preferences,
which has led to the distinction between welfare-
and resource-based concepts of distributional justice
in Dworkin (1981a, b).9 Second, owing to outcome
uncertainty, we have the question of who carries the
risk of adverse outcomes of present actions.
Concerning the responsibility for preferences, the
above approach – as a fairness-based construct –
pursues a way in between welfare- and resource-based
concepts of distributional justice. It is based on indi-
vidually evaluated outcomes and thus on welfare. So
the costs of preference heterogeneity and preference
uncertainty are socialized. If we hold each generation
responsible for its preferences, this implies a higher
level of intergenerational risk sharing than Dworkin
(1981b) proposes. However, due to being defined
relative to the status quo, this sharing mechanism is
constrained to impose no undue burden on the pres-
ent generation. It grants claims for more resources that
are based on uncommon preferences only if these
preferences could have been better met in the status
quo. So the present generation is held responsible for
paying regard to future preferences when effecting
changes to the status quo. However, the present gen-
eration does not have to change the status quo in a way
that is detrimental to itself. In other words, each
generation needs to use only the additional welfare
that it generates in changing the world in order to
compensate future generations for possible hardships
resulting from extravagant preferences. Thus, the
concept seems to provide a reasonable balance be-
tween intergenerational risk sharing and individual
responsibility for preferences.
Concerning outcome uncertainty, each genera-
tion is responsible for bearing most of the risk that it
causes by changing the status quo. In our concept,
future generations have a ‘‘right of veto’’ against
actions that they consider to be detrimental to their
well-being. Thus, if the present generation wants to
implement changes to the status quo that impose
some risk on future generations, this is only possible
if these risks are accompanied by an increase in
expected benefits that all future generations consider
as being an adequate compensation.
Altogether, the above concept of sustainability
seems to achieve at least some congruence of
responsibility and cost-bearing. Concerning prefer-
ence uncertainty, future generations can claim com-
pensation only if changes to the status quo have
worsened their situation. They are thus, in line with
Dworkin (1981b), considered to be largely respon-
sible for their preferences. Concerning outcome
uncertainty, each generation bears only the (risk-in-
duced) costs of those actions from which it potentially
profits.
Choosing an ‘‘appropriate’’ risk of harming a future
generation
Let us now turn to the question of how an
‘‘acceptable’’ probability of harming a future gen-
eration (i.e., a) can be chosen. There are two main
possibilities. If we consider sustainability to be a
descriptive concept, then the value of a is simply a
measure of altruism, which can be observed but not
judged.
In contrast, if we perceive sustainability as a
normative concept, then a has ethical implications.
In this context, it is informative to construct sus-
tainability by a contractarian exercise along the lines
of Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986). Note that in
contrast to our analysis in section Sustainability as
risk containment, the rational choice framework is
essential for this argument.
As argued by Sugden (1993), this enterprise can
only succeed if we introduce some moral constraints
a priori. For this, imagine that the present and all
future generations come together behind a specific
variant of Rawl’s veil of ignorance. Behind this veil,
each generation knows when it will live but has only
the information concerning future preferences and
future outcomes that the present generation has
outside the veil. Furthermore, behind this veil, the
decision for an action shall require unanimity.
In such a setting, each generation will decide upon
its future fate with the information available at present.
Thus, each generation is subject to the trade-off
between increasing its expected benefit and the
accompanying change in its risk. Based on its own risk
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aversion, it will choose a level of a. Whenever there is
no infinite risk aversion and whenever an increase in
expected benefits has to be bought with an increase in
risk,10 this a will be strictly greater than zero. Due to
the unanimous decision rule behind the veil, the
generation that is most likely harmed will determine
the final choice of an action.
In this way, an action is agreed upon, if for each
generation, the probability of being harmed is below
the generation’s chosen value of a. So a can be con-
structed from the risk preferences of the future indi-
viduals. Indeed, this construction closely resembles
the Rawlsian defense of a maximin decision rule in
social choice theory (cf. Roemer, 1996, ch. 5).
This exercise shows that a strictly positive proba-
bility of harming future generations can be defended,
because given the presently available information,
future generations will demand such a setting of a.
Furthermore, this argument suggests that in a rational
choice framework, a should be related to risk aver-
sion. Thus, although we have to allow for possible
differences between present and future risk prefer-
ences, currently observed levels of risk aversion may
provide useful information for choosing an accept-
able boundary to the probability of harming future
generations.
Discussion and conclusions
In this article, we have proposed to use the fairness-
based criterion of sustainability under uncertainty
advanced in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006) in a broader
context. We have shown that this criterion provides a
link between commonly used tools of risk manage-
ment and a potentially operational notion of sus-
tainability. This link can be used to transfer risk
management tools from their positive context to the
normative setting in which questions of sustainabil-
ity are commonly argued. Furthermore, we have
addressed the question whether this definition of
sustainability is ethically tenable and in which way its
basic notion of an ‘‘acceptable’’ risk for future gen-
erations can be defended.
It need not be pointed out that this analysis does
not provide a fully operational concept and that some
of our arguments have a somewhat speculative touch.
Furthermore, we have focused in our examples on
a rather limited conception of sustainability by
excluding the social and cultural dimensions, and
have employed only the simplest possible tools of risk
management. Finally, we have constrained our
exposition to the rational choice framework that is
predominant in economics.
The latter three restrictions are mainly for pre-
sentational simplicity. The concept can handle any
consequences of present actions, social, and cultural
consequences included because it is based on the
welfare of future individuals as they perceive it. The
concept of welfare, as it is understood in economics,
comprises everything that a person might regard as
being relevant to evaluating his or her situation and
is thus sufficient to capture a broad perspective of
sustainability. Furthermore, since we have based our
concept on a generation, we can also cover all forms
of cultural and social interactions between individ-
uals as long as these individuals perceive them as
being relevant for their personal welfare.
Concerning the second restriction, the concept
can be used in conjunction with more advanced
tools of risk management, even with full-scale
optimization techniques. However, although mean-
variance analysis has been abandoned in economic
theory, it is still a frequently used tool, and it has the
advantage that it is easily communicable. Thus, it
serves well for a simple exposition of the feasibility of
connecting sustainability and risk management.
The restriction to the rational choice model is
mainly for presentational purposes. With the
exception of the discussion in section The ethical
dimension of a risk-based concept of sustainability,
our analysis only requires that we can discern what
harms a future individual. We have used individual
preferences to define harm via an envy-based crite-
rion. However, since we do not need a quantitative
measure of harm, we could also use Sen’s concept of
capabilities or a resource-based concept, like the
availability of basic goods. Thus, our main concept is
applicable with constructs of well-being that differ
substantially from those embedded in the rational
choice framework.
Our approach could also be criticized for being
overly preoccupied with risk as well as for using a
rather specific approach to handling risks. Con-
cerning the first point, we have argued that uncer-
tainty is a necessary consequence of evaluating the
future consequences of present actions. Thus, risk
lies at the core of the sustainability problem.
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Neglecting this point would defer the risks that
result from present actions completely to future
generations, which seems to be incompatible with
any ethically meaningful concept of sustainability. So
while it may be helpful to construct sustainability as a
concept of weighing the fulfillment of present and
future needs against each other in a general dis-
course, any application of sustainability in actual
decision processes has to recognize that sustainability
is essentially a weighing of risks and not of certitudes.
Concerning the second point, it is obvious that
restricting the probability of unfavorable outcomes is a
somewhat peculiar approach to handling uncertainty.
Economists will argue that it is even an irrational
approach, at least when considered in the framework of
expected utility theory, and that using expected future
welfare would be more consistent with economic the-
ory. However, as Chichilnisky (2000) has shown,
expected utility theory can be insensitive to catastrophic
risks and is, thus, at least a debatable framework for
discussing sustainability. Furthermore, the approach
upon which our analysis builds is widely used in statis-
tical test theory and, to a lesser extent, in the theory of
social targeting. Finally, it has the advantage that it
encompasses several oftenusedconcepts of sustainability
and is consequently rather an extension of existing
definitions than a new definition. Thus, although it is
undebatably an unusual approach, we would argue that
it is a particularly advantageous approach.
Notes
1 Thereby, we proceed in the framework of rational
choice; that is, we presume that individuals have rational
preferences that are directly related to individual well-
being. There exists an extensive body of literature that
criticizes this framework and that provides possible alter-
natives (cf. e.g., Sen, 1982, 1999; Roemer, 1996). How-
ever, discussing the relative merits of the numerous
alternative frameworks is beyond the scope of this article.
Furthermore, we use the rational choice framework
mainly to highlight the connection to economic decision
theory. The analysis in this section requires only that we
are able to decide whether an outcome of a present action
will harm a future individual or not. To this end, we
could use most of the alternative frameworks available,
like capability- or resource-based approaches.
2 In this article, we will not emphasize the distinc-
tion between harming future generations and harming
future individuals because this is not relevant to our
analysis. In our context, a future generation can be seen
as being harmed, whenever at least a fraction b of
its individuals are harmed, with b taking any value
between 0% and 100%. e.g., We could use unanimity
or a simple majority rule.
3 In the definition commonly used in social choice,
fairness consists of envy-freeness and efficiency, see
Foley (1967) and Varian (1975). In this context, envy
refers to a situation in which one individual prefers the
situation of another individual to its own situation.
4 For this, we have further assumed that future bene-
fits are normally distributed.
5 As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) have shown,
mean-variance analysis is not generally consistent with
expected utility maximization and thus results in inferior
outcomes for most utility functions than more complex
approaches, like full-scale optimization techniques.
6 For a detailed exposition see Markowitz and Todd
(1987).
7 Note that this comparison refers only to the math-
ematical properties of hypothesis testing and the risk-
based concept of sustainability. Test theory proceeds
in a positive context, whereas sustainability is usually
discussed in a normative context. Therefore, these
approaches cannot be compared in general.
8 This is coded into law in most countries. The pun-
ishment for causing death by declining to help is usually
substantially lower than that for actively contributing to
someone’s untimely end.
9 This distinction is mirrored in the sustainability
discourse, although the link to responsibility for prefer-
ences is sometimes obscured by the common assump-
tion of homogeneous preferences.
10 Given efficient behavior of all generations, the
latter condition will always hold.
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